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SYMPOSIUM ON ELECTRONIC 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 
POST–9/11 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
SEVERELY UNDERMINING FREEDOM 
Bob Barr* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Any article concerning surveillance must begin with these words: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.1   
Unfortunately those words appear to be in disrepute, their meaning 
denigrated, their import in disrepair.  America, in the twenty-first 
century, appears to have become afraid of—or disinterested in—the 
“Grand Experiment in Freedom” begun almost 250 years ago by a group 
of patriots determined to govern themselves free from the control of an 
over-weaning and powerful government.  Today, virtually the entire 
range of policy decisions within the purview of our federal government 
appear to be governed by fear, deception, or mistake—not by the 
courage exemplified by our forefathers.  We went to war in Iraq 
ostensibly over the fear of “weapons of mass destruction.”  President 
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Offices of Edwin Marger, with a national and international practice in both civil and 
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Bush authorized a program of electronic surveillance of Americans 
because he said it was necessary to “protect ourselves” from acts of 
terrorism.2  The National Security Agency (“NSA”), or some other 
agency, maintains that we can only be “protected” by listening to our 
conversations without benefit of probable cause to believe that we are 
actually a threat, nevermind that the program is illegal.3  Senators such 
as Senator Specter of Pennsylvania and former Senator DeWine of Ohio 
proposed to either legitimize that program ex post facto, or extend to the 
executive ever increasing elasticity in shadowing American citizens.4   
These are dark clouds obstructing freedom in American life today.  
Some are covert; some are overt.  Without the First Amendment, and a 
relatively free press, there would have been no discovery of this or other 
programs that are claimed by our benevolent government to have been 
devised for our protection.  What might we do without this overly 
protective father figure looking after us?  These new powers asserted by 
the federal government—powers that the president claims are necessary 
to protect us—were never intended to be part of the fabric of our society.  
But through an assertive executive branch, a pliant Congress, and a 
deferential judiciary, they have been sewn and stitched progressively 
into our lives, just as surely as Betsy Ross stitched our first flag.   
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TODAY 
The Republic’s founders intended flexibility and the concomitant 
ability of the people and their government to be able to respond in a 
fluid manner given the changing of the times.  The Fourth Amendment 
was meant to meet the needs of all Americans, and designated power to 
their appointed temporary governing bodies only on those occasions 
when it became necessary to intrude into the lives of its citizens and 
violate their privacy in order to serve the greater good.   
What lawyers in the Administration of George W. Bush apparently 
fail to grasp in the government’s zeal to intrude into the private lives of 
Americans by, among other things, the NSA electronic spying program 
in the “War on Terror,” is that the law, and its attendant lawful behavior, 
provide all the weapons needed to fight terrorism; no “sacrifices” are 
necessary.  No one disputes that there is a need to battle acts of 
                                                 
2 See Bruce Fein, Trusting the White House, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at A13. 
3 See id. 
4 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006, S. 3001, 
109th Cong. (2006); Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2455, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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terrorism, but the methods that the Bush Administration has chosen are 
misdirected.   
Of course, this process of government over-reaching did not start the 
day after 9-11.  In fact, since at least the 1960s, the Fourth Amendment 
has been systematically whittled in favor of the government in a variety 
of ways.5  In 1967, for example, in Katz v. United States,6 the Supreme 
Court definitively defined, for the first time, the formula for a tightening 
of access to the Fourth Amendment power of evidence-suppression.  In 
that landmark beginning, the Court intoned both a subjective and 
objective “reasonable expectation of privacy” and, in doing so, mandated 
that the privacy “expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’”7   
Less than a generation later, in a trilogy of cases—Rakas v. Illinois,8 
Rawlings v. Kentucky,9 and United States v. Salvucci10—the U.S. Supreme 
Court set in motion a true loosening of the strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment with the advent of the focus on “reasonable expectation of 
privacy,” and created a seminal event in the history of the Amendment.11  
What those decisions did, in practical terms, was to limit the “persons 
and places searched” provision to an ever-shrinking number of people 
and circumstances.  In other words, if I put my drugs (or bomb-making 
materials) in your briefcase, I could not complain about the search no 
matter how constitutionally problematic, because I had given up my 
“expectation of privacy.”  This analysis based on the judicially-created 
“expectation of privacy” test for Fourth Amendment protection, 
however, makes little sense in many situations in which our citizens 
necessarily find themselves involved in the modern world.   
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 
83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
6 389 U.S. 347. 
7 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
8 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
9 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
10 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
11 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104 (holding that considering petitioner’s admission at 
suppression hearing that he did not believe acquaintance’s purse would be free from 
search, there was not sufficient showing that his reasonable expectations of privacy were 
violated); Salvucci, 447 U.S. at 93 (holding that Fourth Amendment rights should be 
analyzed by asking not merely whether defendant had a possessory interest in the items 
seized, but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched); Rakas, 439 U.S. 
at 148 (holding that there was no showing that mere passengers in a car had any legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car). 
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Is one private phone call more worthy of protection than another, 
simply because of the particular phone we use?  Do we have a lesser 
“expectation of privacy” if we communicate by e-mail as opposed to 
phone, simply because e-mail transmissions travel through an ISP over 
which we have no control?  Are our private medical records considered 
by us to be less private simply because they are kept at our doctor’s 
office where they necessarily must stay?  Or are our private financial 
records not considered to be private?  Common sense tells us that such 
situations are quite reasonably considered by Americans to be just as 
“private” as the letters that were the more common mode of 
communication in the late eighteenth century when the Fourth 
Amendment was crafted.  Yet, because of the artificial, “expectation of 
privacy” test, through which the federal government has driven a Mack 
truck, this common sense violation of privacy, which was the basis for 
the Amendment, has been rent asunder.   
Restrictions on the Fourth Amendment’s protections have not ended.  
The federal courts, in their zeal to find reasons to justify expanded 
government law enforcement powers, have found ever more imaginative 
ways to limit personal freedom, especially those freedoms guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment.  The “good faith exception” of United States v. 
Leon12 allowed searches even if the warrant subsequently was shown to 
be unsupported by probable cause.13  Garbage is no longer protected.14  
                                                 
12 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  In Leon, on the basis of information from a confidential informant 
of unproven reliability, the Burbank, California, police department set up surveillance of a 
pair of individuals suspected to be involved in the sale of illegal drugs.  Id. at 901.  From 
their investigation, the officers were led to Alberto Leon, who had been previously arrested 
for a drug offense and about whom a different tip was received regarding storage of illegal 
drugs.  Id. at 901-02.  Upon the arrest of two other suspects, the officers retrieved items that 
they believed were utilized in Leon’s drug business.  Id.  Subsequently, a search warrant 
was issued for Leon’s residence where drugs were found.  Id. at 902.  Leon challenged the 
use of the evidence citing a lack of probable cause for issuance of the warrant, and the 
government responded with the notion that the “exclusionary rule should not apply where 
evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant.”  Id. at 903. 
13 Id. at 925. 
14 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).  In Greenwood, a Laguna Beach, 
California police officer received information from both federal agents and a neighbor that 
Greenwood may be involved in drug trafficking.  Id. at 37.  The officer attempted to verify 
this information by setting up surveillance on Greenwood’s home.  Id.  She observed 
vehicles making short stops late in the evening and followed one of these vehicles to 
another residence that was also under investigation.  Id.  The officer asked the regular trash 
collector to pick up and turn over Greenwood’s trash bags to her without mixing them 
with the other collected trash, and when the garbage collector did so, the officer found 
evidence of narcotics use within the trash.  Id. at 37-38.  The fruits of this search were the 
basis for a warrant used to search the residence, which unearthed cocaine and hasish.  Id.  
Greenwood challenged the searches of his trash, contending, inter alia, that it violated his 
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The mail, though protected generally, is now subject to a number of 
exceptions;15 as a result, the protection of the mails is not absolute.16  
Additionally, there is no Fourth Amendment right of privacy in bank 
records despite the fact that in the modern world it is virtually 
impossible to conduct necessary affairs in one’s own behalf without use 
of financial institutions, credit cards, doctors’ offices, insurance 
companies, and the myriad of other institutions prevalent in our lives.   17 
                                                                                                             
Fourth Amendment rights.  Id.  The Supreme Court first explained that the search of the 
trash “would violate the Fourth Amendment only respondents manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.”  Id. at 
39 (citations omitted).  As a result, the Court found that the respondent had sufficiently 
exposed his trash to the public as to defeat any claim to Fourth Amendment protection.  Id. 
at 40.  “It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public 
street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of 
the public.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Additionally, the Court noted that the material had 
been placed at the curb for transference to a third party, here, the trash collector.  Id.  
Therefore, “having deposited their garbage ‘in an area particularly suited for public 
inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of 
having strangers take it,’ respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the inculpatory items that they discarded.” Id. at 40-41 (citations omitted). 
15 United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003).  In Young, the defendant was 
convicted of various counts involving deception of IRS agents and making false statements 
on IRS forms to enable him to purchase gasoline and diesel without paying federal excise 
taxes.  Id. at 1303-04.  His scheme involved large and frequent cash transactions that were 
sent to him via Federal Express two to three times per month.  Id. at 1304.  As part of its 
investigation, an IRS agent requested that Federal Express allow the government to x-ray 
the packages, without a warrant.  Id.  The packages were found to contain large amounts of 
currency and based on this finding, four warrants were issued for searches of Young’s 
residence and place of business.  Id. at 1304-05.  The Eleventh Circuit found that Young 
“certainly had a subjective expectation (or hope) of privacy” but that “[n]o reasonable 
person would expect to retain his . . . privacy interest in a packaged shipment after signing 
an airbill containing a explicit, written warning that the carrier is authorized to act in direct 
contravention to that interest.”  Id. at 1307-08.  Similarly, in United States v. Smith, after 
receiving information that Smith was receiving illegal drugs, specifically LSD, in the mail, 
using a third party to actually receive the material, the postal inspector intercepted a letter 
that bore another person’s name and address, but had Smith’s name and address crossed 
out on the envelope.  39 F.3d 1143, 1144 (11th Cir. 1994).  When the other party allowed the 
inspector and a police officer to open the letter in her presence, they discovered LSD.  Id.  
The letter was taped to Smith’s door, and the officer obtained a search warrant for the 
residence.  Id.  At trial, Smith moved to suppress the letter, claiming that the third party 
had agreed to accept the letter, which allegedly was supposed to contain cash from the 
sender, but that she had no authority to open the letter.  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals found the arrangement that Smith had with the third party was insufficient to 
preserve his legitimate expectation of privacy in the letter as he was neither the sender nor 
the addressed recipient, even though he had not given permission for the third party to 
open and examine the contents of the letter.  Id. at 1145. 
16 Young, 350 F.3d at 1309; Smith, 39 F.3d  at 1145; see also supra note 15 (discussing Smith 
and Young). 
17 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 425 (1976). 
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The courts have also upheld the substitution of the Aquilar-Spinelli 
standard as it relates to the test of informant reliability.18  Similarly, in 
Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court held that a purely anonymous tip 
supported to some degree by corroboration (based on surveillance) of 
some otherwise innocent data, could establish the legality of the search.19  
In Gates, the Court concluded that a totality of the circumstances test 
must be utilized to determine probable cause.20  Even stale information 
can be updated and/or corroborated to form the basis for probable 
cause.21   
Recently, the Court has even found an anticipatory search warrant 
lawful; that is, a search warrant that is granted but then can be simply 
stuck in a police officer’s pocket or file to await a triggering event before 
it is executed.22  In fact, even falsely sworn statements in a search 
                                                 
18 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (holding that informant’s basis of 
knowledge and facts establishing informant’s reliability and credibility should be 
considered in determining probable cause from this information); Aquilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108 (1964) (holding that affidavit for search warrant may be based on hearsay 
information so long as informant is “credible”). 
19 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
20 Id.  The court concluded 
[T]hat it is wiser to abandon the “two-pronged test” established by our 
decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli.  In its place, we reaffirm the totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable-
cause determinations. . . .  The task of the issuing magistrate is simply 
to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 
“veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing 
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis 
for . . . [concluding]” that probable cause existed.  We are convinced 
that this flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the 
accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth 
Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed from 
Aguilar and Spinelli. 
Id. at 238-39 (citations omitted). 
21 United States v. Magluta, 198 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999). 
22 United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1500 (2006).  In Grubbs, Mr. Grubbs purchased 
child pornography from a website that was operated by a postal inspector acting 
undercover.  Id. at 1497.  The delivery was arranged, and the postal inspector submitted a 
warrant application to a federal magistrate detailing the operation.  Id.  There was a caveat 
in the application, stating that 
[e]xecution of this search warrant will not occur unless and until the 
parcel has been received by a person(s) and has been physically taken 
into the residence. . . .  At that time, and not before, this search warrant 
will be executed by me and other United States postal inspectors, with 
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warrant are no longer grounds to discard the warrant.23  This is true even 
if the misrepresentations are knowingly made, but given the allowed 
inclusion of other circumstances, even innocent ones, while discounting 
the untruths, another justification is found for the search.24   
                                                                                                             
appropriate assistance from other law enforcement officers in 
accordance with this warrant’s command. 
Id. (citations omitted).  In addition, to this statement, the application relied on two 
attachments that were not in the body of the warrant request that described both the 
residence and items sought.  Id.  The warrant was issued as requested and the package 
delivered two days later.  Id. at 1497-98.  Grubbs’ wife signed for the package, took it inside, 
and moments later, inspectors and officers detained Grubbs as he attempted to leave his 
home.  Id.  Grubbs was supplied with a copy of the warrant approximately thirty minutes 
into the search, but the items supplied to Grubbs did not include the affidavit which 
described the triggering condition of the search warrant.  Id.  Grubbs consented to 
interrogation, admitted to ordering the tape, was placed under arrest and items seized.  Id.  
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of these so-called “anticipatory” search warrants, 
stating that “they are no different in principle from ordinary warrants.”  Id. 
23 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172-73 (1978).  In Franks, Cynthia Bailey reported to 
police on March 5, 1976, that she had been sexually assaulted by a man in her home.  Id. at 
156.  Bailey provided a description of her assailant, detailing that he wore a white thermal 
undershirt, black pants with a metallic buckle, a brown leather coat, and a dark knit cap.  
Id.  She also described some of his physical characteristics, including age, weight, race, 
height, build and facial hair.  Id.  By coincidence, that same day, Franks was arrested in 
connection with a different assault of a fifteen year old identified as “Brenda B.”  Id.  While 
awaiting a bail hearing, Franks made an incriminating statement before being read his 
Miranda rights, expressing confusion over who it was alleged that he assaulted.  Id.  On 
March 8, the officer who heard the incriminating statement mentioned it to a detective on 
the Bailey case.  Id. at 157.  Based in part on this information, the detective sought a search 
warrant, including in his application affidavits from those who worked with Franks that 
indicated that he often wore the type of clothing that Bailey indicated was worn by her 
assailant.  Id.  The judge issued the warrant and officers seized items matching the 
description Bailey provided.  Id.  Franks challenged the admissibility of the evidence, 
noting that the warrant was not truthful and that those allegedly interviewed by the 
applying officer were not and that any information they may have given to another officer 
differed from what was presented in the affidavit.  Id.  The Court ultimately held that to 
challenge a warrant based on veracity of the affidavit, the challenger must not present a 
conclusory statement that the warrant was based on untruths, but rather 
[t]here must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless 
disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by 
an offer of proof.  They should point out specifically the portion of the 
warrant or affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be 
accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. 
Id. at 171. 
24 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984) (holding that a search 
warrant could have been procured without relying on a hidden beeper, but rather via the 
visual surveillance of the defendant’s vehicle and residence); United States v. Levasseur, 
816 F.2d 37, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1987) (asserting that thirty paragraphs in the Cross Affidavit 
supplied sufficient independent information to support a finding of probable cause). 
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There are numerous other examples of this continuing and profound 
lessening of prohibition against governmental intrusion.  The courts 
continue, by and large, to be in lockstep with various administrations, 
including the current one.  For example, even as it solidified the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard, the Supreme Court held 
that the use of a pen register does not constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.25  And recently, courts have gone further when 
addressing computer privacy issues.  In United States v. Steiger, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that a “Trojan Horse” virus that enables a hacker to 
discover and download files from another person’s computer is not 
unlawful because interception is defined as containing a requirement 
that the electronic communication be obtained contemporaneously with 
its transmission.26  Thus, a government hacker can lawfully search all of 
the files in existence on any citizen’s computer and seize the same files 
on the sole basis that the files were electronically created at a time prior 
to the search and seizure.   
All of these examples, which are not exhaustive, are weapons that 
are being utilized by the government, not only as part of its “War on 
Terror,” but in other types of criminal investigations as well.   
III.  TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT SUPPLANT FREEDOM 
A new era of science and technology envelopes us; technology has 
opened new vistas to snoop beyond any extent envisioned by those 
founding geniuses, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and James 
Madison, among others.   
To be sure, we as a nation have been attacked; we are at peril from a 
new kind of enemy—a shadowy, will o’ the wisp enemy is at our shores.  
We should not shrink from this exacting truth.  But, were not the threats 
to our shores, our very existence, in 1776 and in the first few decades 
thereafter, also serious?  Were they any less dangerous to the infant 
                                                 
25 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1979).  “Pen register” is defined as “a 
mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the 
electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released.”  Id. at 736 n.1.  The 
Court held that the pen register did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes because a person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
numbers she may dial on a telephone.  Id. at 742.  Additionally, the Court noted that pen 
registers have no ability to record the contents of the communications, and that “all 
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone 
company. . . [and] moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent 
records of the numbers they dial.”  Id. 
26 318 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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nation than the threats facing us today?  The fledgling country was at 
risk at every turn, but in the exercise of the kind of vision and courage 
that has been our trademark throughout our history, our Founding 
Fathers did not flinch from their belief in a freedom such as the world 
had never seen, and has yet to be duplicated.  They fashioned a fair, but 
strict, set of prohibitions that focused its force on the power of the 
government to intrude upon the rights and privacy of its citizens.  Are 
we in greater danger now than then?  I think not.  Our neophyte nation 
possessed but a ragtag collection of volunteers to defend our shores, and 
little military equipment.  Now, two and a quarter centuries later, we 
have a standing army, navy, and air force that certainly is the most 
powerful by far of any in the world today.  Are we at risk?  Certainly, 
but do we demolish the tenets of the very fiber of the being of our nation 
to meet those challenges?  Or do we remain true to what we have always 
been?  Technology, especially electronic technology, tempts the 
dilettante, is like the biblical serpent to the slothful, and invites abuse.   
That threat cannot be allowed to change or diminish the 
underpinnings of the way of life we espouse.  We cannot abandon our 
beliefs.   
A. Lawful Interdiction Methods Exist 
News Flash—The Fourth Amendment works!  So does the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”),27 and the special court created by 
FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”).  There is no 
necessity whatsoever, under the guise of “protecting” us from acts of 
terrorism, to create new vehicles of legally or illegally-sanctioned 
intrusion into the lives of Americans.  Nor is it wise to legalize an illegal 
program—the NSA spying program; to do so would be constitutionally 
devastating.  The interrelationship of the tri-partite form of government 
would actually work if the legislative and judicial branches would 
simply stop rolling over and allowing the executive branch to neuter 
them.  Each branch must fully comprehend and carry out its 
constitutionally-defined role.  This is especially true in light of the fact 
that advances in technology and science now enable any government to 
secretly invade a citizen’s privacy at will and to whatever extent it 
desires.  In the words of Louis Brandeis: Privacy is the “right to be let 
                                                 
27 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1846 (2000). 
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alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.”28   
I have a friend, a former trial lawyer, who shared a story of a case in 
the late 1970’s in a small town in Vermont.  The defendants in a criminal 
case were distributing marijuana and hashish from a farmhouse well off 
the beaten path.  The Vermont State Police received a tip and, since they 
could not get physically close, they used devices developed in Viet Nam, 
a Startron29 and Javelin,30 to spy from a great distance.   
These devices—even way back then—were able to read a newspaper 
from as far as two miles away, provided, of course, there were no 
obstructions.  The police chose not to seek a warrant, but rather to 
surveil.  Among the things they watched were the bathroom activities of 
some of the dopers’ girlfriends.  As frequently happens in “the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”31 there was no 
independent judicial determination of probable cause, even though it 
likely existed.  My friend reminded me of the curtilage cases, notably 
Hester v. United States32 and its progeny, and stated he had framed his 
motion to suppress around the “curtilage” invasion issue.  He won much 
of the motion; the fact of which saved his client about ten years of his 
life.  Had the police obtained a warrant, all evidence almost certainly 
would have been admissible.  The other important point for these 
considerations is that over thirty years ago, there existed the ability to 
visually intrude from miles away.  Now, just consider where we are 
today—heat-seeking cameras of phenomenal range; cell phone 
transponders and microphones; cameras that can read license plates 
from space; data mining computers that make information retrieval 
systems, of one generation removed, seem so ancient that they appear to 
be like writing on stone tablets.   
The question remains: does the government have to resort to illegal 
activity to protect us?  Or is it sufficient to simply follow existing law 
and the principles and requirements of the Constitution?   
                                                 
28 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
29 Robert C. Power, Criminal Law: Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed 
Formulation for Visual Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 28 n.92 (1989).  “Startron” is 
a night vision scope.  Id. 
30 Id. at 83 n.262.  A Javelin is a nightscope, “capable of magnifying existing light 50,000 
times.”  Id. 
31 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
32 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
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This debate and inquiry are framed around the desire for freedom as 
balanced against occasionally necessary intrusions by a government, but 
premised always on the notion that we have a government that is itself 
to be governed by restraint.  In the post-9/11 world, the necessary 
restraint has been lost, and although some of it had perished even prior 
to 9/11, the process has accelerated greatly since that awful day.  Science 
and technology have long since left nothing to deter it save the 
determination of the humans who utilize it.   
There is recently, a wonderful, thoughtful, and well-researched book 
by David Holtzman titled Privacy Lost, which I will now discuss.33  I 
commend it to anyone concerned about the future of freedom and 
privacy in America.   
The NSA and the view of the president that it is his absolute right to 
authorize any wiretap he deems appropriate notwithstanding, there are 
only two lawful bases for the creation of a legal wiretap:  the Federal 
Wiretap Act34 and the FISA35 of a decade later.  After 9/11, the USA 
PATRIOT Act36 added to the list of crimes for which a wiretap could be 
legal, now including violent activities, terrorism, and suspected 
hijacking. 37   
The Federal Wiretap Act is, as it should be, a tightly regulated 
statute controlled by the courts of the United States.  The fundamental 
procedure is that an application is made; if there is probable cause a 
judicial warrant is provisionally issued; then there are controls upon the 
listening, and a report back to the court is mandatory.38  Thus, not only is 
there a court-required sanction, but continued judicial oversight.39   
FISA has been the law of the land since 1978.40  In its essence, the law 
is a portion of the solution to the problem of terrorism, which is part and 
parcel of a new form of espionage.  Espionage is defined by Webster’s as 
                                                 
33 DAVID H. HOLTZMAN, PRIVACY LOST (2006). 
34 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 
Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)) (known as the Federal 
Wiretap Act). 
35 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1846 (2000). 
36 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115 
Stat. 212 (2001). 
37 Id. 
38 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). 
39 Id. § 2518(6). 
40 See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1846 (2000). 
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the “practice of spying,” but in practical reality it is more.41  It is also the 
attendant desire to do harm to the entity spied upon, as those upon 
whom the spying is being perpetrated are presumably the enemy of 
those who are doing the spying. FISA and its court are equipped to 
address the fight against terrorism, as it was equipped to address the 
spying of every enemy that has existed since FISA was enacted and as 
strengthened since 9/11.   
FISA, and the court created by it, allow for the issuance of warrants 
for surveillance of our nation’s enemies, administer the prosecution 
procedures of those enemies once caught, and control the dissemination 
of the evidence to those appropriately able to have access to it.42  For 
example, a defense lawyer for a person charged with a crime of 
espionage against the United States must be cleared by the FBI to the 
same extent as the nature of the evidence involved in the case.  If the 
crime involves “Top Secret” evidence, then the lawyer must consent to a 
background check for clearance to a level of “Top Secret.”  Access to the 
evidence is monitored by a professional staff and never leaves a secure 
facility except under guard with prior court approval.  This is the 
appropriate, pre-existing procedure that addresses this category of 
evidence in the fight against terrorists.  The judges of FISC are selected 
by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.43  What is important here 
is that it is a court—a branch of the judiciary—constitutionally charged 
with balancing powers of the executive branch by its oversight.  Or, in 
the words of too many to count, the decisions are of “a neutral and 
detached” decision-maker (magistrate).  This is, yet again, another 
example of how we, in the main as a nation, prior to this Administration, 
have sought to maintain the balance of a tri-partite government.  
Although, it should be noted, the USA PATRIOT Act diminished the 
standard from the traditional “probable cause” to “reasonable cause.”44   
B. The NSA and Government Snooping 
Where does a secret and warrantless NSA spying program fit within 
these parameters?  Simply put, it does not.  However, President Bush 
reportedly concluded that FISA warrants took too long to obtain, so the 
                                                 
41 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 427 (11th ed. 2003). 
42 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1846.  For example, § 1842 provides the procedure for and format 
requirements for pen trap devices.  Further, the use of the information is governed by 50 
U.S.C. § 1845.  The Act also provides for congressional oversight.  Id.  § 1846. 
43 Id. § 1842. 
44 50 U.S.C. § 3103 (2000). 
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NSA spying program was initiated shortly after 9/11.45  The program, 
dubbed by the Administration as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program” 
as part of its effort to lead the public—and Congress—to believe it did 
not surveil U.S. citizens within the U.S. borders (which it did), authorizes 
the NSA to wiretap without seeking a warrant.46  President Bush 
apparently authorized it in 2002 by secret executive order.  “Vast 
quantities of international telephone and Internet communications were 
intercepted without court approval.”47  The president originally claimed 
that only people connected to Al-Qaeda were tapped, but that has been 
subsequently determined to be false.48  A president, under the guise of 
national security, is wiretapping Americans without benefit of the 
interposition of the courts and without probable cause, simply because 
he believes his role as “commander in chief” allows him to do so.   
It is not only the NSA program that is suspect.  The FBI has engaged 
in a program of attempting to track the locations of cell phone users; but 
two federal judges, one in New York and the other in Texas, have 
stopped them (at least temporarily) in the absence of a showing of 
evidence that a crime had occurred or is in progress.49  The respective 
courts in those cases concluded that to allow the FBI to go forward 
would violate long-standing privacy protections.50  More recently, in 
court proceedings, it has been revealed that federal agents are using cell 
phones to serve as general microphones—to listen to and record 
conversations not only by the holder of the cell phone, but others in the 
                                                 
45 HOLTZMAN, supra note 33, at 231.  “In 2005, the New York Times ran an article revealing 
that President Bush had signed a secret executive order in 2002 authorizing the NSA to 
conduct warrantless wiretaps of Americans.”  Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  “Last year, Bush said he had authorized the NSA to eavesdrop—without 
warrants—on international calls and international e-mails of people suspected of having 
links to terrorists when one party to the communication is in the USA.”  Leslie Cauley, Bush 
Lied Repeatedly About Scope of NSA Spying on Americans, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, available 
at http://www.unknownnews.org/0605190511NSAspying.html. 
48 HOLTZMAN, supra note 33; see also Cauley, supra note 47 (“The NSA program reaches 
into homes and businesses across the nation by amassing information about the calls of 
ordinary Americans—most of whom aren’t suspected of any crime.”). 
49 See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, FBI Dealt Setback on Cellular Surveillance, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 
2005, at A05.  “The FBI may not track the locations of cell phone users without showing 
evidence that a crime occurred or is in progress, two federal judges ruled, saying that to do 
so would violate long-established privacy protections.”  Id.  These rulings came as 
controversy increased over the ability of the federal government to conduct domestic 
surveillance as a result of the broadened powers granted under the USA PATRIOT Act 
after the 9-11 attacks.  Id. 
50 Id. 
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vicinity—a process that can be accomplished even if the cell phone is not 
turned on.51   
An observation:  whenever any legislative body takes action based 
on fear, the results are generally deleterious.  The USA PATRIOT Act 
was conceived in fear; its gestation infested with fear; fear was its 
midwife; and its infancy fed by fear.  The Act presented an invitation to 
abuse, and of course government agencies have accepted the invitation 
wholeheartedly.  This law was intended to facilitate the interdiction of 
terrorism and terrorists.52  Holtzman chronicles the abuses with 
explanations of each, but here they are referred to generically by type of 
target.  The Act has been used to target anti-war protesters, organized 
crime, pranksters, the homeless, and artists.53  It has been utilized to 
protect the intellectual property of big business.54  Similarly, the Act was 
the moving force in the deportation of an ideological undesirable.55  Of 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Declan McCullagh & Anne Borache, FBI Taps Cell Phone Mic as Eavesdropping 
Tool, CNET NEWS, Dec. 1, 2006, available at http://news.com.com/FBI+taps+cell+phone+ 
mic+as+eavesdropping+tool/2100-1029_3-6140191.html.  “The technique is called a ‘roving 
bug,’ and was approved by top U.S. Department of Justice officials for use against 
members of a New York organized crime family who were wary of conventional 
surveillance techniques such as tailing a suspect or wiretapping him.”  Id. 
52 The very title of the Act reveals the purpose: “Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.” 
53 HOLTZMAN, supra note 33, at 226-29.  In 2004, Drake University was ordered under the 
authority of the USA PATRIOT Act to surrender all documents regarding an anti-war 
conference held on its campus.  Id. at 226.  Additionally, a “Justice Department report refers 
to more than a dozen cases in which federal authorities have used the Act to investigate 
private citizens, order surveillance, use wiretaps, and seize assets in nonterrorism criminal 
cases . . . .  Money laundering, drug trafficking, blackmail and white-collar crimes are just a 
small sampling. . . . ”  Id. at 227.  As for pranksters, the Justice Department is prosecuting a 
citizen as a terrorist for pointing a hand-held laser at an airplane.  Id.  Further, a homeless 
man in New Jersey was arrested as a terrorist for loitering in a train station.  Id.  Steve 
Kurtz, an artist who used materials he created in a home laboratory for sculpture materials, 
was impacted by the USA PATRIOT Act when his wife of twenty years died of heart 
failure at their home.  Id. at 230.  When medical authorities tending to Mrs. Kurtz noticed 
the laboratory equipment, the FBI was notified and they sealed off his home, confiscating 
everything including his wife’s body.  Id.  He was labeled as a “bioterrorist” by the FBI and 
was indicted for “mail and wire fraud” and faces up to twenty years in prison.  Id. 
54 Id. at 228.  The FBI invoked the USA PATRIOT Act to obtain financial records from the 
ISP of an individual who ran a fan web site dedicated to the television show Stargate SG-1.  
Id.  The fan was allegedly engaged in criminal copyright infringement and because of his 
world wide contacts via his website, he was alleged to have been engaged in a conspiracy 
against the Motion Picture Association.  Id. 
55 Id.  Sami-Al-Hyssayen, a student at the University of Idaho, was arrested for his work 
as webmaster for the Islamic Assembly of North America.  Id.  As part of his job, he 
maintained links to outside web sites, some of which advocated criminal activity.  Id.  
Although he was ultimately found not guilty of terrorism, in exchange for that verdict, he 
agreed to be deported.  Id. 
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course, it has also been used to target Muslims.56  How is it done?  
Technology is the fulcrum—surveillance, wire taps, telephone taps, 
computers bugs—all weapons in the arsenal of the contemporary 
government watchers.   
One of the many ironies of the NSA domestic surveillance spying 
program is that there was a Justice Department investigation conducted, 
but not into the legality or illegality of the program itself.57  Rather the 
investigation was undertaken to determine the identity of those who had 
leaked information confirming the existence of the program.  Instead of 
determining whether the NSA program violated our laws—FISA,58 the 
Stored Communications Act,59 and/or the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act60—the top law enforcement agency of the nation is looking 
to identify the people who informed the public of the wrongdoing of its 
government.61   
Congress has the power to create rules governing any surveillance 
based on the Constitution’s structure of shared power over the nation’s 
defense.62  The president may possess some inherent authority to 
monitor the communications of Americans in the name of national 
security, but it is neither unilateral nor unlimited.  The Congress, when it 
passed FISA, made repeated findings of the importance that any 
surveillance conform with the judicial checks and balances requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment.  All of this was done because it has become 
evident over the years that the NSA, or any other agency of the 
government, was not to be trusted absolutely.  In earlier decades, the 
NSA had created files on such “threats” as Dr. Benjamin Spock, Joan 
Baez, and Martin Luther King, Jr.63  Indeed, the NSA attempted to 
surveil all Quakers in the United States, except, of course, the Quaker 
President, Richard M. Nixon.64  Had it included the former president in 
its effort, the NSA might have avoided Watergate.   
                                                 
56 Id. at 228-29.  “The New York Times reported that thirty-four credible human rights 
complaints were made by Arab and Muslim immigrants over a six month period in 2003.”  
Id. 
57 HOLTZMAN, supra note 33, at 231. 
58 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846 (2000). 
59 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000). 
60 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). 
61 Dan Eggen, Size & Scope of the Interagency Investigative Tool Worry Civil Libertarians, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2006, at A07. 
62 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 8. 
63 HOLTZMAN, supra note 33, at 220 n.14. 
64 Id. 
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But the year 1978 appears to be too long ago to have kept the 
congressional memories fresh; the collective memory seems to have 
forgotten the four precepts of FISA.  First, Congress must have full and 
complete disclosure of all surveillance programs.65  Second, Congress 
commanded that the statutory procedures it created—FISA—would be 
the “exclusive” procedures for conducting surveillance of Americans in 
the name of national security.66  Third, Congress required a judicial 
check on every wiretap of the electronic communications of Americans 
in this country.67  Fourth, and finally, the Congress, through FISA, 
required that court orders be predicated upon probable cause either that 
the target of electronic surveillance was an “agent of a foreign power” (a 
term very broadly defined in the law) or was an American citizen 
knowingly conspiring with or aiding such an agent.68   
Although FISA has been amended a number of times since its 1978 
enactment, including several changes effected by the 2001 USA 
PATRIOT Act, these four requirements/prohibitions have never been 
removed or weakened.69  They have remained in full force and effect, 
serving the nation well since their enactment almost thirty years ago.  
Indeed, at a public hearing in 2000, before the House Intelligence 
Committee, then NSA Director, General Mike Hayden (now head of the 
CIA), testified explicitly that if the NSA believed it necessary to surveil a 
U.S. person in the United States, the NSA must secure—and always did 
secure—a court order.70  Now, other than new enemies, and new 
responders in the government, what has changed?  Not the warrant 
requirement under FISA; that remains the law of the land in 2007 as it 
did in 2000 when General Hayden so testified.   
                                                 
65 50 U.S.C. § 1808 (2000).  “On a semiannual basis the attorney general shall fully inform 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, concerning all electronic 
surveillance under this title.”  Id. § 1808(a)(1). 
66 Id. § 1808. 
67 Id. § 1842.  Judicial oversight is required via the detailed procedure laid out in this 
section for obtaining a warrant.  See id. § 1842(a)-(b). 
68 Id. § 1842(a)(1) (providing that an application may be made to install a pen trap device 
if it is to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or 
that the application was not based on protected first amendment activities); see also id. 
§ 1801(b). 
69 Id. §§ 1841-1846, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-511 (1998); Pub. L. No. 105-272 (2001); 
Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001); Pub. L. Nos. 107-108 and 108-458 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-177 
(2006). 
70 Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. (Apr. 12, 
2000) (statement of Gen. Mike Hayden). 
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The largely somnambulant post-9/11 Congress reacted concerning 
disclosures of the NSA spying program, as mentioned earlier, with two 
different bills, one by Senator Specter, the other by now-former Senator 
DeWine.71  Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, a highly respected 
member of the Senate, a former U.S. Attorney, and immediate past 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee proposed Senate Bill 2453 
on March 15, 2006, titled the “National Security Surveillance Act of 
2006.”72  It is important to note, were he able to get the bill passed, 
Senator Specter would have changed the law to adjust the four pillars of 
FISA.73  Much like Congress seems to have lost its way after 9/11, the Bill 
would neuter the most important elements of FISA.  In so doing, the 
Congress would cede any involvement in checks and balances as 
envisioned by the Founding Fathers.  Partisan politics aside, why would 
any legislative body, in this form of government, do such a thing?  The 
answer is simple, but overwhelmingly disturbing—Congress had 
abandoned its prerogatives.   
Mandatory congressional oversight would have disappeared under 
the Specter bill.74  Congress would legislate without investigating 
because the Judiciary Committee, according to the White House, has no 
right to obtain facts concerning how the executive branch is executing 
FISA (or ignoring it).  This is true, in spite of the fact that Congress is 
entitled to full disclosure of all surveillance programs.75  This represents 
an absolute abdication of responsibility.   
Senator Specter’s bill would have repealed the requirement that the 
president follow the FISA warrant rules; it also would have done away 
with the criminal penalties for violations.76  The president, in this 
                                                 
71 National Security Surveillance Act, S. 2453, 109th Cong. (2006); Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2006, S. 3848, 109th Cong. (2006). 
72 National Security Surveillance Act, S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 1-9 (2006). 
73 S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 4-7. 
74 S. 2453, 109th Cong. §7. 
75 50 U.S.C. § 1808 (2000). 
76 S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 8, 706.  Section 8 states that: 
It is in our Nation’s best interest for Congress to use its oversight 
power to establish a system to ensure that electronic surveillance 
programs do not infringe on the constitutional rights of Americans, 
while at the same time making sure that the President has all the 
powers and means necessary to detect and track our enemies. 
Section 706 provides emergency authorization for the President to authorize electronic 
surveillance without a warrant. 
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scenario, would be forgiven of any criminal misconduct, no matter how 
egregious, as would be all of his subordinates.77   
The bill would have made judicial oversight optional.78  The 
administration could, if it chose, seek the approval of the courts, or 
alternatively not, as the case may be.  In other words, it would have 
given the president the option of following the law or ignoring it.  Such a 
scenario certainly was never intended to prevail in our system of 
government, based as it is on specified and limited government powers 
and respect for the courts and for individual privacy.   
The Specter bill also would have eliminated the “probable cause” 
requirement, meaning there could be electronic surveillance of you or 
me, for any reason or no reason.79  The decision would be purely at the 
discretion of whatever executive branch employee made it.80  When one 
considers how insubstantial the hurdle of “probable cause” is generally 
for law enforcement, the scenario allowed by the Specter bill would 
constitute a gift-wrapping of all of our freedoms and tossing them down 
the drain.   
The ACLU proposed an appropriate alternative to the Specter and 
DeWine bills in the previous, 109th Congress.81  This bill, the “Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006,” 
would have accomplished exactly what the title indicated.  Its salient 
points were a re-emphasis of the exclusivity of FISA for electronic 
surveillance, while maintaining a warrant requirement (although the 
time strictures would be relaxed).82  It also streamlined and added 
resources for this specialized court.  In particular, this 2006 legislation 
would have extended the emergency electronic surveillance period from 
three days to seven, which either the NSA or the FBI could initiate, 
provided the Attorney General was notified within twenty-four hours 
and the application was made within seven days.83  The Attorney 
General could also delegate authority to approve applications to a 
Deputy Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General for National 
                                                 
77 S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 8, 706. 
78 S. 2453, 109th Cong. §§ 6, 704. 
79 S. 2453, 109th Cong. § 703(a). 
80 Id. 
81 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Improvement and Enhancement Act of 2006, S. 3877, 
109th Cong. (2006). 
82 Id.  For example, section 201 would have extended the time stricture from 72 hours to 
168 hours.  Id. § 201. 
83 S. 3877, 109th Cong. § 203, 105(g)(3). 
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Security.84  In addition, the ACLU-backed proposal allowed for 
additional judges and appropriations for the same.85  It also provided 
document security procedures and a specific personnel increase in 
needed areas.86  Finally, the FISA improvement bill would have allowed 
for streamlined procedures to facilitate the needs of the government in 
protecting the nation.87   
All told, the ACLU proposal would have met the needs of twenty-
first century priorities so that law enforcement would not be hampered 
in its battle against terrorists and acts of terrorism.  Indeed, it would 
have enhanced the capabilities of law enforcement while maintaining 
what should be a universally cherished standard of privacy, unless and 
until there is a reason for intruding on it.  By maintaining the 
interposition of a court (though a secret one) and a warrant requirement 
(though a relaxed one) there is an intermediate step, and a need to justify 
an intrusion that is, and should be, fundamental to a free society.  In the 
context of refusing a blank check for the executive branch, and 
reinforcing the involvement of the judiciary, the legislature would take 
an important step toward the re-promulgation of a system of checks and 
balances that has eroded significantly since September 11th.   
Aside from the illegal secret listening and snooping NSA program, 
this administration has been extremely active through the ordinary 
channels of FISA.  Since the 9-11 terrorist attacks, FISA warrants have 
increased by seventy-five percent.88  In 2000, a year before the attacks, 
there were 1,003 approved FISA warrants.89  Since the attacks, and post-
PATRIOT Act, there were 1,724 warrants approved in 2003, and 1,754 in 
2004.90  These warrants, almost never declined by the court, have been 
obtained to break into homes, offices, hotel rooms, and automobiles.91  
They have also been used to install hidden cameras, search luggage, 
eavesdrop on telephone conversations, watch from great distances, pry 
into safety deposit boxes, and intercept emails.92  However, every one of 
these, no matter the nature of the intrusion, was accompanied by a 
warrant, administered presumably pursuant to either a probable cause 
                                                 
84 S. 3877, 109th Cong. § 206. 
85 S. 3877, 109th Cong. § 204. 
86 S. 3877, 109th Cong. §§ 205-206. 
87 Id. 
88 The Associated Press, Government Wiretaps, Searches up 75 Percent, Apr. 1, 2005, 
www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/37/10080. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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standard or the USA PATRIOT Act “reasonable cause” standard.93  Even 
though the court is secret, somewhere in each instance there is a paper 
trail, and perhaps a somewhat therapeutic pause in law enforcement zeal 
while the determination was made to secure the warrant.  In short, the 
Fourth Amendment is at least a part of the equation, giving the 
individual citizen at least a fighting chance that his or her privacy was 
afforded due protection.   
IV.  NEW SURVEILLANCE REDUNDANCE 
The Administration’s fellow travelers are not limited to the Congress 
and its attendant reluctance—at least until just recently with the new 
majority in the 110th Congress—to stand and be counted.  There are 
many others whose involvement comes about in a variety of ways with a 
significant emphasis on money.  One only need look at the total of the 
Homeland Security Grants of Fiscal Year 2005 to know of the enormous 
amount of dollars being spent, and the nature of the expenditures.  The 
“State Homeland Security Grant Program” awarded a total dollar 
amount of $1,062,285,226.94  The “Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program” awarded $386,285,537.95  The “Citizen Corps 
Program” awarded $13,485,708.96  The total awards for Fiscal Year 2005 
were just under $1,500,000,000.97   
Was this money well spent to preserve our lives and our freedom?  A 
simple analysis of the use of the funds in several locations might answer 
those questions.  For example, in Chicago, there is a rapidly expanding 
“Homeland Security Grid” that currently has at least 2,250 cameras, with 
more being added each year thanks to federal funding.98  In 2006, 
Chicago completed a 900-mile fiber-optic grid connected to a $43 million 
operations center that is constantly monitored by police officers, with 
each camera costing $60,000.99  This money might be considered well-
                                                 
93 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2004). 
94 HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS FY05, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Grants_ 
Summary_StLocal.xls (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Spotlight on Surveillance: More Cities Deploy 
Camera Surveillance Systems with Federal Grant Money (May 2005), http://www.epic.org/ 
privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0505/ hereinafter EPIC]. 
99 Id.; see also Hal Dardick, City Will Keep Eyes Peeled Big Time, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 2005, at 
C1 (detailing the extensive camera system that Chicago planned to implement including a 
fiber optic grid of over 1,000 miles and “biochemical sensors to watch for signs of 
terrorism”). 
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spent if it had actually decreased the threat of terrorism and if it did not 
coincidentally intrude into the legitimate privacy of its citizens.  On a 
related point, in 2004, a Milwaukee, Wisconsin study found that law 
enforcement officials in such cities as Detroit, Michigan; Miami, Florida; 
and Oakland, California; abandoned the use of programs utilizing these 
surveillance systems because they had little demonstrable effect on crime 
prevention.100   
Currently, a number of American cities are looking to Great Britain’s 
surveillance system when developing their own.  London already has 
more than 200,000 cameras, with more than four million deployed 
throughout the country.101  In Great Britain, estimates indicate there is 
one camera for every fourteen people, and that the average Briton is on 
camera over 300 times a day.102  Yet “studies have shown these systems 
have little effect on crime.” 103  “It is [much] more effective to place more 
officers” in a location and keep it well lighted.104  If it is true that these 
types of surveillance units do not significantly impact crime, then how 
effective are they at interdicting terrorist activity?  As a partial answer to 
this question no bomber has been caught in Britain as a result of the 
country’s extensive camera system.   
“According to a January [2003] report by J.P. Freeman, a security 
market-research firm in Newtown, Connecticut, [some] twenty six 
million . . . cameras” had, at that time, been installed worldwide.105  
More than eleven million of those had been installed in the United States, 
and many more by now.106  Some municipalities are now incorporating 
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sound-surveillance devices with cameras.107  However, the use of these 
cameras by the government, and the images captured, is questionable.   
A. Are the Priorities in Order? 
The FBI purports to be the point entity in the “War on Terrorism” 
and yet there is evidence that valuable resources have been utilized 
gathering information on antiwar and environmental activists.  “‘They 
don’t know where Osama bin Laden is, but they’re spending money 
watching people like me,’ said environmental activist, Kirsten Atkins.”108  
Atkins’s license plate number had shown up in an FBI terrorism file after 
she had attended a protest in Colorado Springs against the lumber 
industry.109   
In 2006, “an FBI counterterrorism official showed the class, at the 
University of Texas at Austin, 35 slides listing militia, neo-Nazi, and 
Islamist groups.”110  “Senior Special Agent Charles Rasner said one slide, 
labeled ‘Anarchism,’ was a federal analyst’s list of groups that people 
intent on terrorism might [well be] associate[d] with.  The list included 
Food Not Bombs, which mainly serves vegetarian food to homeless 
people . . .”111   
What is troubling about these incidents, and numerous others, is that 
this is indicative of a culture, a thought process.  Remembering that these 
are the same genre of people who are manning the electronic and visual 
surveillance apparatus, what does such overreaching portend?   
Does all of this mean we have become what science fiction writer 
David Brin called in 1998 “the transparent society?”112  “The far-sighted 
Brin underestimated how quickly technological advances . . . would 
make universal surveillance” a very real probability.113  Modern-day 
microprocessors have become immensely powerful, network 
transmissions incredibly fast, hard drives larger, electronics cheaper, and 
software more sophisticated and powerful.114  Improvements are made 
daily. This makes it imperative that manipulators of information and 
surveillance be held accountable.  They must also be controlled by 
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effective laws and aggressive enforcement of those laws.  By 2023 (if not 
sooner), experts predict that any large organization with resources of just 
$10 million “will be able to devote the equivalent of a contemporary PC 
to monitoring every one of the projected 330 million people who will 
then be living in the United States.”115  So it is not only the government 
that is a subject of concern, but the private sector as well.   
B. Defective Data Records 
Of equal importance, as are the law and the responsibility of the 
government keeper’s, is the care taken in creating the databases and the 
information contained within them.  In 2003, Marc Rotenberg, Executive 
Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”), a non-
profit research organization in Washington, D.C., stated: “What seem to 
be small scale, discrete systems end up being combined into large 
databases.” 116  He pointed, by way of example, to the then-recent, 
voluntary efforts of a variety of merchants in Washington, D.C.’s affluent 
Georgetown to pool and integrate their in-store, closed-circuit television 
networks, to make the combine recorded activity available to the 
police.117  In his concern, Rotenberg viewed the collection and 
consolidation of individual surveillance networks into big government 
and industry programs as “a strange mix of public and private, and it’s 
not something that the legal system has encountered much before.”118   
The question, among others, of these conglomerate databases is, 
what if there is defective information contained within them?  According 
to the experts, this is so commonplace as to be beyond question.  The 
result is a potentially monster database being used to shadow, target, 
and move against innocent citizens.   
Computer scientists use the term “GIGO” (garbage in, garbage out) 
to describe the situation of erroneous information becoming a part of a 
database.119  Once in, it skews the validity of the database.120  Whether 
people are buying bread or building bombs, governments and 
commercial enterprises are trying to predict their behavior, through such 
“data mining” (recall the movie “Minority Report”).  The process of 
predicting behavior is an integration of data from widely diverse 
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sources.  Starting with the Internet and proceeding along to such things 
as library records, credit-card receipts, customer cards, and financial or 
medical records, data miners use such information to form their 
predictions.  But—and this is a significant “but”—there are problems.   
The first problem, of course, is the premise on which data mining is 
based—that disparate bits of data on a diverse universe of people (e.g., 
all people who travel by air) can be employed to predict behavior of a 
very small number (e.g., persons planning to hijack an airliner).  Also, of 
course, is the fact that all of these sources are filled with errors.  Names 
are misspelled, one digit is off, information becomes out of date by a 
move or a change of Internet provider, and most importantly, formatting 
distinctions between different databases can cause distortions and 
information loss when merged.121  Perhaps the buyer of bread becomes 
the bomber and the suspected bomber is merely buying bread.   
Larry English, of Information Impact, a database consulting 
company in Brentwood, Tennessee, stated: “It is routine to find in large 
customer databases defective records . . . at rates of at least 20 to 35 
percent.”122  Given the government’s track record, which includes 
maintenance of “watch lists” containing names of such well-known 
public officials as Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy and Georgia 
Congressman John Lewis, it is only fair to presume that secret 
government databases suffer from such errors of at least a similar 
magnitude.   
Effective use of large surveillance databases can be problematic aside 
from the fact it destroys the notion of privacy.  The systems are already 
in place; it is their use which must be responsible, careful, and lawful.  
Reactive use, rather than proactive use, might be one starting point.  For 
example, the 2002 Washington, D.C., sniper search might have utilized 
the surveillance cameras to pinpoint repeat blue Chevy appearances on 
cameras at the scenes as opposed to attempting to predict that a person 
or persons who was disgruntled, had trouble at home, and was 
militarily-trained, was the shooter.   
Gene Spafford, Director of Purdue University’s Center for Education 
and Research in Information Assurance and Security, said in 2003: 
“Almost all of the pieces of a surveillance society are already here. It’s 
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just a matter of assembling them.”123  That process has had an additional 
three years to continue.  The “War on Terror” makes it absolutely certain 
it has continued.  Where do the invalid answers from the tracking 
systems affect us?  Invalid answers can be harmless.  If Victoria’s Secret 
mistakenly mails one percent of its spring catalogue to people who are 
not interested in lingerie, the price exacted to both consumer and 
company is small.  However, if we are discussing a national terrorist 
tracking system, and the rate of error is that same one percent (an 
unrealistically low estimate), then it will produce enormous numbers of 
false alarms, sending investigators on too many wild goose chases, and 
perhaps worst of all, mis-label innocent Americans.124  As Spafford 
stated:  “A 99 percent hit rate is great for advertising, but terrible for 
spotting terrorism.”125   
Where do we demand oversight to combat these errors in the 
databases of the governments?  Is it acceptable in this society for a 
lawyer from Portland, Oregon to spend time in jail because of an error in 
recording a fingerprint in Madrid, Spain (considering the attendant 
prejudice and perhaps lifelong label)?  Fingerprint technology is far more 
easily controlled than that of computers, webs, and networks.  Yet, at 
least the government and much of corporate America is rushing 
headlong into a surveillance society rife with errors and without 
adequate safeguards of either electronics or law.   
C. “One DOJ” Database 
According to a December 26, 2006 article in the Washington Post, the 
Department of Justice is building a massive database that allows state 
and local police to search millions of files from the FBI, DEA, and other 
federal law enforcement agencies.126  As of December 26, 2006, the 
database is purported to hold over one million case records, and “is 
projected to triple in size over the next three years.”127  There is no report 
concerning this new database as to what, if any, procedures have been 
utilized by the government to ensure that information contained within 
it is correct, current, relevant, and without errors.  The goal is to give all 
federal, state, and local law enforcement access to all records of cases 
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containing personal information about people, many of whom have not 
been arrested or charged with any crime.   
Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty, said, in a memo sent the 
week before Christmas to the FBI, U.S. Attorneys, and other senior 
Justice officials, that federal authorities will “accelerate . . . efforts to 
share information from both open and closed cases.”128   
The “garbage in, garbage out” proviso discussed previously is 
especially relevant to this database as there are no controls on what an 
individual agent puts into a criminal, or worse, potential criminal file.  
Rumor, innuendo, and the lies of informants are part and parcel of the 
entire criminal investigative process.  That apparently will not stop this 
progression of “OneDOJ,” unless Congress intervenes.   
D. The Department of Justice:  Investigation of Its Role in the NSA Program 
In November 2006, the Inspector General for the Department of 
Justice reported to the House Judiciary Committee that the office had 
“decided to open a program review that will examine the Department’s 
controls and use of information related to the program,” but the 
investigation is not expected to address whether the controversial 
program is an unconstitutional expansion of the power of the president, 
as its critics and a federal judge in Detroit, Michigan have charged.129  A 
Justice Department spokesman, Brian Roehrkasse, stated that the agency 
welcomed the review, and that the Justice Department believes the 
review “will assist Justice Department personnel in assuring that the 
department’s activities comply with the legal requirements that govern 
the operation of the program.”130   
The Inspector General’s office, however, rejected the request by more 
than three dozen Democrats to investigate the secret program, which 
monitors phone calls and emails between people in the U.S. and abroad 
when a link to terrorism is suspected.131  One of the goals of this 
investigation could be a determination as to whether the spying program 
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is in compliance with FISA, discussed previously.132  I would like to pose 
a rhetorical question in that regard.  Unless the NSA spying program 
had a double secret (the author is reminded of the double secret 
probation that Dean Wormer placed on the “Animal House” fraternity in 
the movie of the same name) application for judicial authorization for 
electronic surveillance, and/or searches, of those suspected of espionage 
and international terrorism, then how can there be compliance with 
FISA?   
One observation that critics and questioning Democrats have made 
was the timing of the announcement of the investigation.  The request 
for additional clearances was made on October 20, 2006, just prior to the 
election, and were approved just after the elections.133  Of course, 
Attorney General Gonzales had been pushing the former Republican-led 
Congress to pass what amounts to an ex post facto legalization of the 
program as discussed earlier concerning the Specter and/or the DeWine 
bills.  Those bills died in the 109th Congress as well they should.134   
V.  THE BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND A FREE SOCIETY—WHERE ARE 
WE TODAY?   
Again, a quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis is apropos to what is 
confronted in the world we have inherited today.  Justice Brandeis 
predicted:  
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy have become available to the government. . . . 
Ways may some day be developed by which the 
government, without removing papers from secret 
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it 
will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home. . . .  ”It is not the breaking of 
his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers that 
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property.”135   
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A more prescient pronouncement would be hard to find.   
At least two federal judges, one in Texas and one in New York, have 
upheld traditional “probable cause” standards in denying the FBI the 
ability to track the movements of cell phone users in the absence of a 
showing that a crime had occurred or was in progress.136  The judges did, 
however, approve other requests in those cases including the logging of 
calls made and those received.137  A reasonable translation of that ruling 
is that the FBI should investigate and not take short cuts, but when there 
is in fact evidence of criminal misconduct, they will get what they want.  
At least, in these two cases, we have come full circle with the recognition 
that the Fourth Amendment is still the law of the land, and that, as it 
persists, there is vitality to the concept of constitutional freedom in this 
country.   
There is also welcome evidence that the new, Democrat-led 
Congress is forcing the legislative branch of our government to begin re-
asserting its role in ensuring that the executive branch operates within 
the bounds of the law and the Constitution.  The very first hearing of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in the 110th Congress, for example, 
considered and received testimony on the role of data mining and its 
impact on privacy rights of American citizens.138  A week later, the 
Attorney General was intensely questioned before the same panel of 
Senators about secret surveillance, warrantless opening of mail, and 
other invasions of privacy.139  If these early actions by the 110th Congress 
are followed by two years of real oversight, and passage of protective 
legislation like Senator Russ Feingold’s Senate Bill No. 236, a bill to 
require reports to Congress on federal agency use of data mining, 
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introduced on January 10, 2007, there just might be some real 
constitutional light at the end of the dark tunnel in which we have been 
living since September 11.140   
We must not, however, be content with minimalist efforts without 
sustaining power.  We must always remember that power, of any 
government, once attained is never easily relinquished.  This Article has 
emphasized the electronic in its purview, but an old fashioned 
communication system note provides a reaffirmation of this most 
fundamental of principles of government power acquisition.  On January 
8, 2007, it was widely reported that, as President Bush signed a recent  
postal reform bill, he added a signing statement that, though this law 
allegedly enforced existing postal privacy, allowed the opening of mail 
by federal agents for “exigent circumstances” without the interposition 
of a warrant.141  Will Congress step in here too and force the president, 
believing himself all-powerful, as a self-proclaimed “commander-in-
chief” to abide by the Constitution to which he swore an oath in 2001 
and again in 2005?  Of course, it is not just the current president.  History 
teaches us that each president considers the powers granted or taken by 
his predecessors to constitute a floor, not a ceiling, for the powers he will 
enjoy.   
For its part, the Bush Administration announced January 17, 2007, 
that it would suspend the “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” which is the 
name it gave to the program of warrantless eavesdropping on American 
citizens in the United States without any court orders.142  The 
Administration stated that it would henceforth run activities conducted 
under that program through the FISC.143  This announcement reflects the 
reality of a president no longer being able to count on a somnambulant 
Congress to ratify or at least not conduct serious oversight of his 
activities in this area, and the announcement is therefore a welcome step.  
However, insofar as this Administration has in the past simply changed 
the name of problematic programs and then continued them, the 
Congress must conduct vigorous and continued oversight to understand, 
in much greater degree than it has thus far, exactly what the 
Administration has been doing in this regard.  Once Congress has done 
so, it must then take steps to ensure that the Administration actually 
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stops the unlawful and unconstitutional practice of surveilling American 
citizens without court orders. 
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